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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States imports over $49 billion in FDA-regulated food 
products1 and over $71 billion in USDA-regulated agricultural products 
each year.2  Put in other terms, as of 2005, 15% of all food consumed in 
the United States was imported.  This is an increase from only 11% to 
12% a decade earlier.3  More strikingly, these import figures include
60% of U.S. consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables and more than
1. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOOD PROTECTION PLAN: AN INTEGRATED
STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING THE NATION’S FOOD SUPPLY (2007), available at http://
www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodSafetyPrograms/FoodProtectionPlan2007/ucm1325
65.htm. 
2. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
(FATUS): Monthly Summary, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FATUS/monthlysummary. 
htm (last visited May 17, 2010) (listing $71.913 billion in imported agricultural products 
in calendar year 2007 and $80.488 billion in calendar year 2008).  The USDA numbers
include some food products also regulated by FDA, such as grains, fruit, and seeds, as 
well as some products not used as food, such as animal hides and rubber.  See id. n.1. A
current number limited to meat, eggs, and poultry does not appear to be available. 
3. GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPORTS FROM CHINA 5 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34080.
pdf. 
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75% of U.S. seafood consumption.4  From China alone, the United States
imported $4.9 billion in agricultural and seafood products in 2007:
roughly a fourfold increase in the past decade.5 
It is, in fact, China that has given imported-food safety a new political 
relevance in the United States.  Although food products imported from 
China have so far been traced to relatively few serious U.S. injuries,
problems in related product categories are a significant ground for 
concern. Since the beginning of 2007, this includes 246 deaths from 
contaminated blood thinner,6 the death of large numbers of dogs and cats 
from pet food contaminated with melamine,7 and the discovery of
diethylene glycol—a poisonous industrial chemical—in toothpaste.8 
Within China itself, the story is significantly worse. In late 2008 and
early 2009, infant formula and other milk products contaminated with 
melamine killed at least six children and sickened almost 300,000 
people, many of them young children.9 The health consequences were
4. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1. Fresh produce and seafood are both 
categories that present significant opportunities for contamination and spoilage. 
5. BECKER, supra note 3, at 5. 
6. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 11 
(2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf. 
7. As of May 2009, the actual number of dog and cat deaths confirmed by FDA 
as caused by melamine-tainted pet food was sixteen.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA’s 
Ongoing Pet Food Investigation 4 (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/For
Consmers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048201.pdf.  However, press reports indicated that melamine 
was suspected in “perhaps thousands” of pet deaths during this time, Pet-Food Companies
Settle Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2008, at A2, and FDA indicated that the sixteen
confirmed deaths might be an extremely conservative number.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 
supra, at 4 (“FDA recognizes that there may be many more pet illnesses and deaths than
the 16 deaths it has confirmed so far.”). 
8. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Toothpaste Imported from China May Contain
Diethylene Glycol (June 13, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/SafetyInformation/ 
SafetyAlertsforHumanMedicalProducts/ucm153155.htm (describing diethylene glycol as 
“a central nervous system depressant and potent kidney and liver toxin”).  This is perhaps
a perverse incident of history repeating itself.  Diethylene glycol was the poisonous substance
involved in the elixir sulfanilamide incident that is generally thought to be the event that 
led to the passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.  See Carol Ballentine, 
Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA
CONSUMER MAG., June 1981, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm125604.doc. 
9. James T. Areddy, Authorities in China Likely Knew of Bad Milk, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 6, 2010, at A10; MORRISON, supra note 6, at 12.  Recent news reports indicate that
as of early 2010 Chinese authorities were still discovering tremendous quantities of 
contaminated milk powder. See, e.g., Gordon Fairclough, China Finds Tons of Tainted
Milk Powder, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2010, at A10 (indicating that Chinese authorities had 
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significant. Over 50,000 of the affected individuals were hospitalized,10 
and it appears that many may suffer lifelong kidney problems from the 
incident. Many less dramatic incidents in recent years have made the
Chinese public understandably suspicious about food safety.11  Given the
huge volume of annual imports, it seems only a matter of time before 
one of the food-related health problems now common in China surfaces 
in Chinese products exported to the United States.
Similar problems can be expected with foods imported from other 
countries with underdeveloped domestic regulatory structures. Beyond 
China, the United States has confirmed recent U.S. outbreaks of hepatitis 
A traced to green onions from Mexico,12 salmonella traced to cantaloupe
from Mexico,13 hepatitis A traced to strawberries from Mexico,14 and 
cyclospora traced to raspberries from Guatemala.15 Additionally, the
dramatic rise in aquaculture operations in recent years—many of which 
rely on antibiotics, fungicides, and pesticides not approved for use in the 
United States—suggests that there may be additional, latent risks associated 
with imported seafood.16 
Moreover, many of the most common food safety problems can be 
traced to more fundamental environmental problems, such as unclean 
water and contaminated soil.  Unclean water is a major concern for both 
microbial and chemical contamination.  On the microbial side, many
common disease-causing pathogens can be traced to human or animal
waste in water supplies.  On the chemical side, many developing 
countries are not successful in blocking the discharge of large volumes 
of industrial chemicals into oceans, lakes, rivers, and streams.17  To the
“seized more than 60 tons” of the contaminated powder and were seeking to track down 
“[a]n additional nearly 100 tons” that had already been sold by a particular company). 
10. MORRISON, supra note 6, at 12. 
11. Waikeung Tam & Dali Yang, Food Safety and the Development of Regulatory 
Institutions in China, 29 ASIAN PERSP. 5, 5–9 (2005). 
12. LINDA CALVIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE ECONOMICS OF FOOD SAFETY:
THE CASE OF GREEN ONIONS AND HEPATITIS A OUTBREAKS 2 (2004). 
 13. Linda Calvin, Produce, Food Safety, and International Trade: Response to U.S.
Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Imported Produce, in  INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND FOOD SAFETY: ECONOMIC THEORY AND CASE STUDIES 74, 85–88 (Jean C.
Buzby ed., 2003). 
14. Id. at 83–85. 
15. Id. at 80–83. 
16. See generally FOOD & WATER WATCH, IMPORT ALERT: GOVERNMENT FAILS
CONSUMERS, FALLS SHORT ON SEAFOOD INSPECTIONS 14 (2007).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward?: The Costs of 
China’s Environmental Crisis, FOREIGN AFFS., Oct. 2007, at 38, 42–44. 
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extent these industrial chemicals build up in the soil, particular plots of
land can become unfit for safe agricultural production.18 
Given the rising share of U.S. food production that is imported from 
developing countries, the U.S. faces increasing risks to its food supply 
from problems inherent in food production in less developed economies.
This certainly includes substantial risks of isolated breakouts of 
foodborne illnesses that sicken hundreds of people, killing a smaller
portion of them.  More frighteningly, the recent infant formula crisis in
China serves as a stark reminder of more catastrophic outcomes: a single 
adulterated product can cause potentially permanent injuries in hundreds 
of thousands of people.
These events have focused attention on food safety reform.  Current 
U.S. imported-food safety policy is based heavily on ex post measures 
such as border inspections,19 tort liability, and the threat of aggressive 
investigations20 into significant outbreaks of foodborne illness.21  Yet  
many modern food safety problems are difficult to detect through
preconsumer testing,22 and the vagaries of international business make it 
18. Id. at 42 (“As much as ten percent of China’s farmland is believed to be polluted, 
and every year 12 million tons of grain are contaminated with heavy metals absorbed 
from the soil.”).
19. I classify border inspections as ex post measures because they can at best
check the outcome of the production process.  Although these are not as purely ex post 
as measures such as tort liability, which take effect only where there is an actual harm to 
the consumer, they are more closely related to these ex post measures than to ex ante
regulatory requirements.  Moreover, for imported products the cleanest ex ante/ex post
distinction appears to be a classification of measures in the territory of the importing 
country as ex post and classification of measures in the territory of the exporting country
as ex ante.
20. In the case of a significant outbreak, civil or criminal penalties might be imposed
for violation of ex ante requirements.  However, the virtual lack of enforcement except in 
response to an outbreak suggests that these are better analyzed as ex post requirements. 
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. The need to rely on production processes comes from limits on both technology
and resources.  Border inspections, an outcome-based regulatory measure, can be
reasonably effective as a way of monitoring for known contaminants that are likely to be
spread evenly through a particular shipment of food. Pesticide residues are a classic 
example.  If an appropriately large sample from a shipment of apples does not have
excessive pesticide residues, a border inspector can be reasonably confident that the
shipment overall does not have excessive residues.  In contrast to pesticide residues,
microbial contaminants such as E. coli or hepatitis A might be present in only a small 
part of a shipment, making sampling strategies ineffective.  Chemicals not typically used 
in food production, such as melamine, cause a related problem.  Unless there has been a 
recent problem with a particular chemical, border inspectors are unlikely to test for it even if a
test is easily available.  For example, there appears to be some evidence that aquaculture
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difficult to translate outcome-based liability into ex ante standards of 
care. Accordingly, there appears to be an emerging consensus that an 
effective food safety regime must find a way to set and enforce ex ante 
requirements for production processes abroad.23 
There is no consensus, however, on how best to enforce these ex ante
requirements.  Current proposals move in three directions, relying to
different degrees on three basic regulatory strategies: (1) direct extraterritorial
regulation; (2) delegation of regulatory authority to private entities; and 
(3) delegation of regulatory authority to foreign government agencies.24 
For the first strategy, direct extraterritorial regulation, FDA has
already moved toward expanding its geographic reach.  The agency has 
set up small foreign offices in several food-exporting countries; pending 
legislation directs FDA to continue this process25 and to develop a dedicated
staff of inspectors for the specific purpose of inspecting foreign food
facilities.26  With respect to the second strategy, delegation to private
entities, FDA is in the process of implementing a voluntary third-party
certification program for foods, and pending legislation would give the
agency substantial discretion to require third-party certification of many
food imports as a condition for market entry.27  As to the third strategy, 
delegation to a foreign government agency, FDA is already focusing 
additional resources on helping to build foreign regulatory capacity. 
Pending legislation would give FDA authority to determine whether 
foreign regulatory systems provide safety levels equivalent to the U.S.
system28 and to permit foreign government agencies to act as third-party
certifiers for market entry.29  Although each of these strategies may have
some role to play, it is not clear that current proposals give sufficient
thought to how to allocate resources between these three options.  
operations in certain countries are regularly changing the chemical additives they use to 
stay ahead of European testing regimes.  See FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 16, at 
12–13. 
23. See generally infra Part IV.B (discussing two pending food safety bills relying 
on ex ante regulatory strategies). 
24. A pure thought experiment might also include a fourth option, delegation to a 
treaty-based international organization.  Up to this point, states have been extremely reluctant 
to grant direct regulatory enforcement powers to international organizations.  There does 
not appear to be any reason to believe this will change in the foreseeable future—particularly
in an area, such as food safety regulation, requiring a broad regulatory footprint for effective
enforcement. An important exception might be limited, regionally based supranational 
organizations such as the European Union. 
25. S. 510, 111th Cong. § 309 (2009). 
26. H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § 208 (2009). 
27. See infra notes 127, 131, and accompanying text. 
28. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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The Article proceeds as follows.  Part II examines regulatory enforcement
generally, viewing the problem through the lens of two basic decisions: 
whether to target behaviors or outcomes, and whether to rely on direct 
enforcement or third-party monitoring.  Part III turns to imported-food 
safety. It begins with an overview of current U.S. policy and then 
examines the effects of foreign production on the choice between ex post 
and ex ante regulatory strategies.  Because of the limits of tort law for 
regulating multinational activities, ex ante regulation may be more 
important for imports than for domestically produced products.  Part IV 
focuses on options for ex ante regulation of imported food.  It sets out 
three regulatory strategies and three principal-agent problems that should 
influence the choice between them.  Direct extraterritorial regulation, 
delegation to a private entity, and delegation to a foreign government 
agency are the three regulatory strategies included in current reform
proposals. The three key principal-agent problems are the regulatory 
license problem, interest group capture, and the reality of bribery and 
threats in many food-exporting countries.  Part V examines these three
principal-agent problems in more detail, demonstrating that they play out 
in different and somewhat unexpected ways under each of the basic 
regulatory strategies.  Part VI touches briefly on the role of international 
trade law.  Finally, Part VII concludes with some observations on the 
relationship between funding decisions, delegated regulation, and the
scope of government. 
II. FORMS OF REGULATION
Traditional regulation is out of fashion; alternative regulatory 
instruments are all the rage.  Regulated parties are instructed to meet
performance standards,30 identify hazards and mitigate risks, and avoid 
tort liability.  In short, regulated parties are given an ultimate objective 
and instructed to use judgment to meet that objective. 
Yet judgment is a scarce resource and may be even scarcer at low 
levels in a firm’s hierarchy—the very levels at which many risk-related
decisions must be made.31  Moreover, it can be costly to monitor the
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 § 1(b)(8) (Oct. 4, 1993). 
31. Cf. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 413– 
26 (2006). 
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exercise of judgment by observing final outcomes.  At times, the cost of 
monitoring for negative outcomes is likely to exceed the cost of
monitoring for undesirable behavior likely to produce negative outcomes. 
This suggests that, in at least some regulatory areas, traditional regulation 
may be socially efficient. 
In particular, it may be less expensive to monitor the production 
processes used by firms than to test the quality of products those firms 
produce. In situations where the specified processes are relatively 
inexpensive but the consequences of failing to follow those processes are
costly, regulation of behaviors should be preferred over regulation of
outcomes.  Possible examples include requirements for hand washing in
food service establishments, using specific grades of material in home 
construction, and keeping frozen meat within a specific temperature
range during transport.
A focus on the importance of monitoring production processes raises a
separate question: who should do the monitoring?  Despite a general 
tendency to look to governments to monitor regulatory compliance,
this is not the only option.  There are numerous situations in which 
governments delegate regulatory authority, either to private parties or to
other governments.32  There are also numerous private entities that 
enforce “voluntary” regimes that permit parties to opt in to a higher level 
of regulation than provided by the relevant state.33 
32. Cf. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 393 (1937). 
33. Voluntary regimes do not exercise authority directly delegated by the state. 
Instead, they rely on control of some type of claim in product labeling or advertising, 
often registered as a certification mark, to require parties to conform to specific
behavioral requirements.  See generally Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for
Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 336–39 (2008) (noting that 
a significant third-party certification industry has developed in response to market pressures
and legal risk associated with international business); Irina D. Manta, Privatizing
Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 402–04 (2009) (discussing relationship between 
certification marks and the trademark registration system).  Regular audits are frequently
required.  Examples are numerous and are often tied to conduct that occurs, at least in 
part, in a foreign country.  Companies that wish to use the “Fair Trade” label must comply
with requirements set by the Fairtrade Labelling Organization and its affiliated entities. 
See Fairtrade Labelling Orgs. Int’l, What Is Fairtrade?, http://www.fairtrade.net/ 
what_is_fairtrade.html (last visited May 18, 2010).  Those who wish to use the label of
the Forest Stewardship Council to assert that their wood products are sustainably
produced must comply with the requirements set out by that organization.  See generally
BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND
THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY (2004). Similarly, those who wish to use 
the label of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) to assert that seafood products were 
sustainably produced must comply with that organization’s requirements.  See Marine 
Stewardship Council, MSC Environmental Standard for Sustainable Fishing, http://www. 
msc.org/about-us/standards/standards/msc-environmental-standard (last visited May 18, 
2010). Companies that use a certification mark without approval of the appropriate 
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The possibility for third-party enforcement of traditional regulation is 
apparent when considering the intersection of regulatory targets and 
monitoring regimes.  Broadly speaking, regulatory approaches can target 










Delegated regulation Tort liability 
These four quadrants represent the spectrum of methods that a 
regulator can use to affect incentives for regulatory compliance.35 This 
typology is independent of the rule/standard distinction: rule-like 
requirements and standard-like requirements exist in each of these
quadrants.36  The horizontal axis—moving left to right between columns—
represents the target of regulation.  If a regulatory regime monitors
behavior, the subject of regulation is not out of compliance if that
behavior results in a socially undesirable outcome.  If a regulatory
regime targets outcomes, the subject is expected to use all legally permitted
methods to reach that outcome.  If the subject nonetheless fails to reach
organization are liable for trademark infringement.  See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:92.50 (4th ed. 2009). 
34. Cf. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Keeping Imports Safe: A 
Proposal for Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1405, 
1411–14 (2008) (distinguishing “production lever” and “outcome lever” as regulatory
approaches).
35. These are, of course ideal types: many real-world regulatory programs will draw on
components of both.  Qui tam actions under the federal False Claims Act and state law
negligence per se suits are bottom-right quadrant actions that rely on standards set out by
top-left quadrant regulatory methods.  Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Point (HACCP)
requirements are a form of ex ante regulation where the government asks companies to 
develop their own regulatory programs but focuses its monitoring on compliance with 
those programs rather than ultimate outcomes. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 120 (HACCP
requirements for juice); id. § 123 (HACCP requirements for seafood). 
36. On the rule/standard distinction, see Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial 
Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1493, 1506–07 (2008). 
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that outcome, the subject is strictly liable for the regulatory violation. 
No amount of best efforts or due care is sufficient to escape liability. 
The vertical axis—moving up and down between rows—represents 
the method for monitoring regulatory compliance.37  The divide between 
direct and third-party oversight is usually thought of as the torts-versus-
regulation debate.38  Traditional regulation and outcome-based regulation 
are enforced through direct oversight,39 while tort law—as a method of
affecting ex ante incentives, rather than of compensating for harms— 
relies on the threat of private lawsuit to encourage parties to avoid 
harming others.  What is interesting when looking at the chart vertically,
however, is that there appears to be a basic regulatory approach— 
delegated regulation—that has been neglected in academic literature.40 
Outside of a few specific regulatory areas,41 there does not appear to be a 
significant literature exploring the ramifications of delegated regulation 
as a matter of institutional design.42 
Although the analogy is not perfect, it may be useful to think of the 
vertical axis as representing something akin to the “make-or-buy” 
37. Cf. Coase, supra note 32, at 397–98. 
38. See generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
39. Public oversight can, of course, be backed up by civil fines, criminal penalties, or
some combination of the two. 
40. Partial exceptions include Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in
Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 
(2005) (criticizing government reliance on private standards not available for free to the 
public); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
636–43, 657–64 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] (discussing role of private 
actors in regulatory standard-setting and enforcement); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, 
Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000)
[hereinafter Freeman, New Administrative Law] (same); Frank Partnoy, Second-Order
Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169 (2007) (arguing that focus of policymakers 
should be on second-order risks associated with private standards incorporated into a 
public regulatory scheme); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53
DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (applying transaction-cost analysis and arguing that a decision to 
outsource standard-setting or enforcement should conceptualized as a make-or-buy
decision); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006) (proposing expanded use of reputation-tracking technologies to
permit private citizens to regulate antisocial behavior in various contexts).  On the
relationship between delegated regulation and the “gatekeeper” literature, see infra note 
57.
41. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
57–61 (10th ed. 2007) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of the SEC’s reliance
on self-regulatory organizations). 
42. Although there is a vibrant literature examining public-private partnerships, the 
focus has primarily been on the blurring of the distinction between public and private in 
many regulatory areas. See e.g., Freeman, Private Role, supra note 40, at 545–48; Freeman,
New Administrative Law, supra note 40, at 842–43. 
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decision.43  When a government chooses to delegate regulatory authority, it
does not typically purchase regulation on the open market by paying 
directly for regulatory services.  Instead, it sets up a situation where
regulated parties pay a private party for services that would otherwise be
provided by the government out of general tax revenues.44  In other
words, a decision to delegate regulatory authority to a private party has 
both efficiency consequences and distributive consequences. The 
efficiency consequences track closely with the traditional make-or-buy 
decision. In some cases it will be more efficient to provide regulation
in-house; in others it will be more efficient to arrange to have that 
service provided by private parties.  The distributive consequences, 
however, are a set of consequences beyond those contemplated in the 
traditional make-or-buy situation. A decision to delegate regulatory
authority to a private party typically shifts the burden of funding
regulation from general tax revenues to the regulated industry and its 
45consumers. 
Moreover, delegated regulation may have advantages when a state
seeks to regulate conduct that takes place in a foreign country.  By
enlisting third parties to monitor compliance, it may be possible to
regulate activities largely unreachable by direct regulation. However,
there may also be inherent limits on such a program that are not 
recognized in current legislative proposals. 
43. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 40, at 400–01. For the reasons set out in the text, I
differ with Shapiro in emphasizing the distributive consequences of decisions to privatize 
regulatory functions. 
44. Here, a caveat is in order.  Delegated regulation does not require a shift from
taxpayer to industry funding and is not the only circumstance where this can occur.  It is
theoretically possible for the government to set up a private regulatory authority and fund 
it out of general tax revenues, although this does not appear to be a frequent occurrence.
More importantly, there are several regulatory areas in which industry “user fees” are used to
fund traditional public regulation.  Significant examples include users fees associated with 
applications to market prescription drugs and medical devices.
45. In other words, it becomes something of an “I make” or “you buy” decision. 
Cf. Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination, 
42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 855 (1985). 
 381









    
 












    
   
 
   
  
     
  
A. Domestic Law 
1. Traditional Regulation
Traditional regulation is what most people think of when they think of
laws or regulations. A typical speed limit is one example.  If a highway
has a maximum speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour, I may not drive 
any faster without risking a ticket.  It does not matter that I might be a 
particularly skilled driver or that there is no one else on the road. I can 
be ticketed for going sixty miles per hour no matter how safe that speed
might be.
As the speed limit example suggests, traditional regulation is a
tremendously important regulatory tool in modern society.  Car accidents 
impose substantial externalities, and many people believe themselves to 
be safer drivers than they are.46  Because of this, any regulatory system
that punishes people only when they cause accidents is likely to result in 
many people driving faster than the socially optimal level.  Although it 
would theoretically be possible to impose fines—or tort damages—for 
accidents at such a level that people would be sufficiently incentivized to
drive slowly, this is unlikely to succeed in practice.  Bounded rationality
suggests that many people—particularly those who are young, old, 
impaired by alcohol, or simply running late—will drive too fast even if 
penalties for accidents are harsh.  It is perhaps because of this that speed 
limits have repeatedly been shown to be an effective means of reducing 
traffic accidents.  Whatever the problems of traditional regulation in 
particular regulatory areas are, it is unlikely to be socially efficient to 
abandon it as a regulatory tool.47 
Despite its advantages, traditional regulation has frequently been 
maligned in academic and policy circles.  The most effective sustained
critique may be in the area of “command-and-control” environmental 
regulation. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress and EPA began mandating 
that plants install the best available control technology (BAT) to reduce 
pollutants from industrial activity.48  In the 1980s, scholars demonstrated
that the unintended consequences of BAT-based environmental policy 
were particularly severe.49  In the wake of this and similar critiques in 
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1183 (1997) (citing a study finding that 90% of drivers considered themselves to be better
than average).
47. But see Strahilevitz, supra note 40, at 1702–05. 
48. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: 
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 173 (1988). 
49. Id. at 173–75. 
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other areas, federal policy has moved increasingly toward outcome-
based regulation in numerous regulatory areas.50 
2. Outcome-Based Regulation
Outcome-based regulations, often known as performance standards,
are the means by which governments directly target outcomes.  In other 
words, “[a] performance standard specifies the outcome required, but 
leaves the specific measures [required] up to the discretion of the 
regulated entity.”51  A classic example of a performance standard can be
found in USDA’s biotechnology regulations.  Rather than providing
procedures for conducting field trials involving regulated genetically
engineered plants,52 the regulations provide simply: “The field trial must
be conducted such that: (i) The regulated [plant] will not persist in the 
environment, and (ii) No offspring can be produced that could persist in
the environment.”53 
Performance standards can have several advantages over traditional 
regulation. They permit regulated entities to choose the most efficient 
process or technology to meet a particular regulatory goal.  They also
promote the development and adoption of new technology.  If a more 
efficient technology becomes available, a regulated party is free to 
switch to the new technology without waiting for the regulatory requirement
to change.  However, performance standards can be difficult to monitor,
particularly when they seek to prevent a low-probability but severe-
consequence outcome.  In these cases, the best regulators can do is often
to use an imperfect proxy for the severe-consequence outcome as a
performance standard.54 Performance standards can be expensive,
50. See Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulations: Prospects and
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 
707 (2003) (noting some areas in which outcome-based regulation has been adopted).
To be clear, traditional regulation is still very much an important part of federal regulatory
programs.
51. Id. at 709. 
52. Essentially all genetically engineered material is considered “regulated” until it
is granted “nonregulated status” by USDA pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2009). 
53. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(c)(5) (2009).  The heading for § 340.3(c) is “Performance 
standards for introductions under the notification procedure.”  Similar outcome-based
requirements follow. See generally id. §§ 340.3(c)(1)–(6). 
54. Coglianese et al., supra note 50, at 714–15. 
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particularly for small companies that might not have the resources to 
develop detailed procedures or new technologies on their own.55  
3. Tort Law
Tort law is the traditional means by which states delegate the 
regulation of outcomes to private parties.  Private parties who have suffered 
a negative outcome can sue—and in that suit seek to prove that a 
defendant behaved in a manner that satisfies the elements of a particular
tort. A person who is harmed can sue on various grounds, such as negligence, 
strict liability, unreasonably dangerous activity, or false imprisonment.
For each of these torts, a plaintiff must demonstrate a negative outcome
in order to recover.  The fact that someone is driving dangerously near 
me gives me no legal rights.  He must create a negative outcome by
running into me before I can sue.56 
Of course, certain intentional torts may border on regulation of 
behavior, rather than outcomes.  Assault, battery, and trespass to land
give a plaintiff the right to sue when the outcome seems difficult to 
separate from the behavior at issue.  However, these torts, which give an 
individual the ability to protect herself and her property, play a relatively
minor role in the regulation of business and industrial activity. 
4. Delegated Regulation
Delegated regulation conditions receipt of some type of state benefit 
on a prior decision by an entity to which the state has delegated 
authority.57  Examples exist in various regulatory areas. The Securities
55. Id. at 712. 
56. Tort law also has at least one major disadvantage as a way of affecting ex ante
incentives.  To the extent that the effect of socially undesirable behaviors is spread 
among a large number of persons, there is a significant possibility no single person will
find it worthwhile to sue. See generally Richard A. Epstein, How To Create—or Destroy—
Wealth in Real Property, 58 ALA. L. REV. 741, 756 (2007).  The two remedies for this are 
a class action suit or a lawsuit by the state using the same private-law mechanisms 
available to private actors. Id.
57. Delegated regulation is related to, but distinct from, the concept of gatekeeping. As
developed in the corporate governance literature, gatekeepers are intermediaries—
generally members of a profession—who perform one of two functions.  First, they may
be able to prevent a transaction by withholding their legally required certification. JOHN 
C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006).
Examples here include the attorney or auditor who must provide an opinion letter before 
a merger can go through.  Id.  Second, they may be repeat players who use their own
reputational capital to “lend credibility to the subject company’s own disclosures or 
predictions.” Id. at 2–3.  An example from the gatekeeping literature is the securities
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and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires publicly traded companies to
have accounting firms sign off on the companies’ financial statements.58 
Most states delegate the process of accrediting law schools to the 
American Bar Association,59 and the federal government relies on 
various accrediting bodies to determine whether particular educational 
institutions can receive federal financial aid.60  USDA relies on both 
private entities and state agencies to certify that farms purporting to sell 
organic products comply with the requirements of the National Organic 
Program.61  And—infamously in the post-2008 economic context—the
SEC relies on the credit rating agencies to rate the creditworthiness of
certain financial products.
analyst.  The analyst’s approval does not fulfill any legal requirement but may affect a 
corporation’s stock price or cost of capital.  Id.
The key distinction between delegated regulation and gatekeeping is the focus of 
delegated regulation strategies on behaviors rather than outcomes.  Many gatekeeping 
functions focus on an ultimate outcome or evaluation, and are enforced largely through 
tort liability.  Do the company’s financial statements accurately represent its financial position?
Are the company’s internal controls “adequate”?  Has the company provided all material 
information to its prospective merger partner? Gatekeepers who fail to exercise the appropriate
level of care in making these types of certifications are subject to professional liability
suits if someone is harmed by the gatekeeper’s error.
By contrast, a delegated regulation strategy seeks to target the relevant behaviors directly. 
A regulator might seek to rely on a gatekeeper in enforcing such a strategy—mandating
that certain accounting procedures are used, that internal controls contain certain procedures,
or that certain types of information are disclosed prior to mergers.  To the extent most
gatekeepers belong to self-regulating professional organizations, there will generally be
elements of delegated regulation in most gatekeeper-based regulatory strategies.  An example 
of an empirically significant delegated regulation entity that would not qualify as a simple 
gatekeeper is a securities industry self-regulatory organization (SRO) such as the Financial
Institutions Regulatory Authority (FINRA) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77ff (2006) (requiring corporate boards to have accounts audited); 
see also id. § 77gg (2006) (requiring corporations to include auditors’ reports in annual 
report).
59. States that do not require graduation from an ABA-accredited law school 
typically have their own programs for accrediting in-state schools that are not accredited
by the ABA. See, e.g., State Bar of California, Accredited Law School Rules, Rules
4.120–.121 (2009). 
60. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1099b, 1099c (2006). 
61. See generally Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523
(2006 & Supp. II 2009); 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.400–.404 (2009). 
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B. International Applications 
These standard regulatory forms take on different characteristics when
applied to foreign activity.  All four types can apply extraterritorially but 
may present different problems when operating in a multinational 
context. The two publicly monitored regulatory forms, traditional regulation 
and outcome-based regulation, face both practical and political difficulties 
when applied to foreign activity.  However, they both have the advantage 
that the government can avoid diplomatic problems by declining to
pursue a particular enforcement action. Tort law, including private rights of
action under federal statutes, relieves the government of monitoring 
responsibilities but permits private parties to initiate enforcement action. 
In areas ranging from the antitrust laws to the Alien Tort Claims Act, this
private power to initiate extraterritorial enforcement actions has frequently
led to diplomatic problems for the executive branch.62 
With respect to delegated regulation, the addition of a third party 
between the government and the regulated foreign party may make it 
possible to regulate otherwise unreachable foreign behavior.63  Traditional 
conceptions of sovereignty can make it very difficult for a government 
to take some actions in foreign territory.  These same actions may raise
less local concern if done by a private party or the government of that 
territory. To the extent this is the case, delegated regulation may have 
particular advantages in regulating foreign activity.
The incentive effects of delegated regulation depend heavily on
whether the third party is a private entity or an agency of a foreign 
government.  When the third party is a private entity, delegated regulation
62. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167–68 
(2004) (discussing briefs filed by foreign governments objecting to private treble-
damages actions under U.S. antitrust law); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rights 
Case Gone Wrong: A Ruling Imperils Firms and U.S. Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Apr. 19,
2009, at A19 (discussing the potential impact of claims brought under the Alien Tort 
Statute on U.S. diplomacy); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 370, 373 (1983) (speech by then-Deputy
Secretary of State discussing foreign objections to private treble-damages actions under
U.S. antitrust law). 
63. Here, a cautionary note is in order.  Delegated regulation is fundamentally different 
from international standard setting.  In international standard setting, multiple national
entities—some private, some public—come together to promulgate generally accepted
international standards on a wide variety of issues.  The most well-known example is 
the International Standards Organization.  Although these entities’ standards are frequently
incorporated into national legislation, standard-setting organizations do not generally
have any enforcement or monitoring role.  A behavior-regulating rule based on an international 
standard can still be enforced through a regime of either public or third-party monitoring—it
would accordingly fit into either the top-left or bottom-left quadrants of the diagram.
See supra Part II. 
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begins to resemble franchise contracting.64  The private entity has 
incentives to maximize revenue, and an effective regulatory scheme
must be structured in a way that aligns the entity’s private incentives 
with the public goals of the program.  When the third party is an agency
of a foreign government, it may also have an incentive to maximize 
revenue. However, it may be more difficult to alter the incentives of a 
foreign agency without affecting broader bilateral relations.  Additionally, 
the foreign agency will naturally take direction from its own government.65 
III. THE CASE OF FOOD SAFETY
A. Imported-Food Safety Regulation in the United States 
Responsibility for imported-food safety in the United States is split
primarily between FDA and USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service.
USDA regulates most meat, poultry, and processed egg products; FDA is
responsible for the safety of all other food sold in the United States.66 
State tort law is available to supplement the ex post aspects of the USDA 
and FDA regulatory programs. 
1. USDA 
USDA’s regulatory program contains significant ex ante and ex post 
components.67  The ex ante aspect of the program relies on delegation to 
foreign government agencies; the ex post component involves direct 
inspection by USDA officials. 
On the ex ante side, USDA-regulated meat and poultry products
cannot be imported unless USDA has certified that the foreign country’s
inspection system ensures compliance with requirements “equivalent”68 
64. See infra note 169. 
65. See infra Part V.C.
 66. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4. More specifically, USDA is
responsible for “the major red meat and poultry species and their products,” with all 
remaining meat and poultry under the jurisdiction of FDA.  GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS: SAFEGUARDS AND SELECTED
ISSUES 6 n.17 (2008).  With respect to eggs, USDA regulates processed egg products, 
while FDA regulates “most whole eggs.” Id.
67. This may be possible in part because the agency has jurisdiction over a high-risk 
product area that is produced by a relatively limited number of establishments. 
68. 9 C.F.R. § 327.2 (2009) (meat); id. § 381.196 (2009) (poultry); id. § 590.910
(2009) (egg products). 
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to those in place in the United States, and that “reliance can be placed
upon”69 certifications issued by that foreign country’s authorities. 
Because USDA requirements in place in the United States are quite 
intrusive, certifying a regulatory program as equivalent appears to
require a relatively high level of ex ante regulation.  As of this writing, 
USDA has certified approximately fifty countries to export meat 
products,70 ten countries to export poultry products,71 and two countries
to export egg products.72 China, which has been the focus of recent 
media attention related to FDA-regulated products, is not currently 
permitted to export USDA-regulated meat, poultry, or eggs to the United
States.73 
The ex post side of USDA’s regulatory program involves a relatively
high rate of border inspections.  The agency physically inspects about 
10% of imported meat and poultry products.74  These inspections include
microbiological tests on samples from approximately 4% of meat and
poultry imports.75 
69. 9 C.F.R. § 327.2 (meat); id. § 381.196 (poultry). 
70. See 9 C.F.R. § 327.2(b) (listing countries eligible to export “the product of
cattle, sheep, swine, and goats”). China is not on this list. Only four countries are eligible 
to export “the product of equines” to the United States. See id. § 327.2(c) (Argentina, Canada, 
New Zealand, and Paraguay).
71. See 9 C.F.R. § 381.196(b) (Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Great Britain,
Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, and People’s Republic of China).  Of these, 
only six are eligible to export the full range of poultry products.  Australia and New 
Zealand may export ratites only. Id. Mexico and China may export only processed poultry
products slaughtered elsewhere, id. n.2, and China’s authorization to export processed
poultry products is currently suspended.  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food Safety & Inspection 
Serv., Countries/Products Eligible for Export to the United States, Dec. 11, 2009, 
http://www. fsis.usda.gov/pdf/Countries_Products_Eligible_for_Export.pdf; see also Bradley
S. Klapper, WTO Panel Probes U.S. Ban on Chinese Poultry, WASH. POST, July 31, 2009. 
72. 9 C.F.R. § 590.910 (Canada and Netherlands). The Netherlands’s authorization to
export egg products to the United States is currently suspended.  U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Food Safety & Inspection Serv., supra note 71. 
73. See supra notes 70–72. 
74. BECKER, supra note 66, at 7 (citing Hearing To Review Recent Recalls in the
Meat Industry Before the Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry of the H. Comm.
on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 6–34 (2007) (statement of Dr. Richard Raymond, Under 
Secretary for Food Safety, Food Safety & Inspection Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, D.C.), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/110-
35.pdf).
75. Id. at 30. 
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2. FDA 
FDA’s imported-food safety program relies primarily on ex post measures. 
Ex ante regulatory requirements exist, but enforcement resources are
focused heavily on ex post measures.
Two contrasts with USDA’s program are particularly important.  First, 
FDA does not require prior approval of a country’s regulatory regime 
before that country can export food products it produces to the United 
States. Second, FDA’s border inspection rate is much lower than
USDA’s. 
On the ex ante side, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)
has long required that imported foods be produced, processed, and stored 
under the same sanitary conditions required for domestically produced 
food.76  Yet despite the recent implementation of registration and 
recordkeeping requirements for foreign facilities,77 enforcement is
extremely limited. Although there has apparently been some double 
counting,78 FDA has asserted that it has approximately 189,000 registered 
foreign facilities that “manufacture, process, pack, or hold food consumed 
by Americans.”79  Between 2001 and 2007, FDA inspected only 1034 
76. See GEOFFREY S. BECKER & HAROLD F. UPTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SEAFOOD SAFETY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 2 (2009) (asserting that FDA “requires that 
all domestic and foreign food manufacturing facilities adhere to Good Manufacturing
Practices”) (citing 21 C.F.R. pt. 110 (2009)), available at http://www.nationalaglaw
center.org/assets/crs/RS22797.pdf. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006) (prohibiting 
the introduction of “adulterated” food into interstate commerce); id. § 342(a)(4) (2006) 
(“A food shall be deemed to be adulterated . . . if it has been prepared, packed, or held
under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or
whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . . . .”).
77. FDA began requiring registration of foreign food production facilities in 2003, 
in compliance with the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. See 21 
C.F.R. §§ 1.225–1.243 (2009).  See generally Registration of Food Facilities Under the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 58,894 (Oct. 10, 2003).  Also in compliance with the 2002 Act, FDA promulgated
extensive recordkeeping requirements for foreign facilities in 2004. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1.326(a) (2009).  See generally Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69
Fed. Reg. 71,562 (Dec. 9, 2004). 
78. BECKER, supra note 66, at 4 n.8 (noting that 189,000 figure in FDA’s Food 
Protection Plan “[is] inflated, because facilities engaged in more than one activity [e.g., 
manufacturing, processing, packaging, or holding food] are counted multiple times”). 
79. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 1, at 6.  FDA estimates that an inspection
of one of these facilities would cost the agency $16,700. LISA SHAMES, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY: FDA HAS PROVIDED
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facilities in fifty-four countries.80 This included a total of only 33 facility 
inspections in China, 30 facility inspections in India, and 104 facility 
inspections in Mexico.81  FDA did not inspect a single Chinese facility in 
2001, 2006, or 2007.82 
Instead, FDA relies almost entirely on ex post measures to ensure the
safety of imported food.  FDA’s primary ex post power is the authority
to refuse admission to foods offered for import into the United States.83 
FDA may request samples of food products offered for import and may 
refuse admission when it appears that the sample has been “manufactured, 
processed, or packed under insanitary conditions,” or is adulterated,
misbranded, or otherwise not permitted to be introduced into the United 
States.84 
In most circumstances, the possibility of border inspection is almost
all there is to FDA import regulation. Because of the high volume of 
imported food products, only a small proportion of them can be sampled 
at the border. FDA inspects only about 1% of food shipments,85 using 
risk analysis techniques to focus its inspections on high-risk product
categories and manufacturers with a history of violating import
regulations.86 
B. Market Failure 
1. The Case for Ex Ante Regulation 
For domestically produced food, the United States has long relied on a 
combination of traditional regulation and tort liability.  In most cases,
the primary type of tort liability applied to foods that actually cause 
FEW DETAILS ON THE RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT ITS FOOD 
PROTECTION PLAN 8 (2008). The total cost to inspect each foreign facility once would be
$3.16 billion. Id.
 80. SHAMES, supra note 79, app. I. 
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). 
84. Id.
 85. JEAN C. BUSBY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY AND IMPORTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF FDA FOOD-RELATED IMPORT REFUSAL REPORTS 6 (2008) (citing ROBERT A.
ROBINSON, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY: FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGES NEEDED TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD 7 (2001)).
86. BUSBY ET AL., supra note 85, at iii.  The inspection percentage is still low in 
high-risk product categories.  For example, FDA sampled around 2% of seafood shipments 
between 2003 and 2006.  Id. at 6 (citing FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 16, at 7).
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harm is strict product liability.87  Compensatory damages are generally 
available and should equal at least the amount of harm caused by the 
food. Punitive damages are available in situations where the defendant’s 
conduct can be shown to be outrageous, reckless, or malicious.88 
Traditional regulation complements, but does not replace, this aggressive
tort liability regime.
The economic case for government regulation of food production is 
relatively straightforward.89  Food safety presents an information problem. 
Consumers cannot readily distinguish ex ante between safe or unsafe 
food, and have some trouble identifying unsafe food ex post.90 This
information problem diminishes the incentive effects of both market
pricing and tort liability.  With respect to market pricing, producers of safe
food are unable to capture a price premium for this characteristic. They 
may be able to obtain a price premium for other characteristics that serve
as a proxy for food safety—organic status is one example—but safety
itself cannot be credibly communicated to the consumer.91 
This information problem also reduces the incentive effects of tort 
liability.  With the exception of a few identifiable illnesses, such as E.
coli and hepatitis A, that are sufficiently severe to capture the attention 
of food safety authorities, consumers can rarely establish with any
87. See generally  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998). Indeed, food that causes harm is 
often considered a classic case of a situation where strict liability is appropriate.
88. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).  In some 
circumstances, courts have permitted juries to award punitive damages even on strict
product liability claims.  See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 833 & n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (collecting cases).
89. The incentives associated with food safety regulation are very different from 
those associated with prescription drug regulation for a simple reason: FDA is not asked 
to weigh the benefits and risks of a turnip or a candy bar before it can be sold.  This 
means that the agency does not have an incentive to overweigh the potential harm versus 
the potential benefit based on the fear that it will suffer a political backlash anytime a 
food product’s inherent risks result in harm in some consumers. On the very different 
incentive structures that apply to FDA premarket approval of prescription drugs, see 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 116–18 (2006) (noting FDA incentives to overweigh
risks of allowing drugs on the market and underweigh risks of keeping drugs off the 
market).
90. Lorraine Mitchell, Economic Theory and Conceptual Relationships Between
Food Safety and International Trade, in  INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOOD SAFETY:
ECONOMIC THEORY AND CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 10–12. 
91. Cf. George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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degree of certainty which of several food items they ate on a particular
day made them sick. This means that consumers are frequently unable 
to assign blame ex post for unsafe food.92  Moreover, even in cases when 
consumers are able to assign blame, it is difficult for them to recover in a
tort action against a domestic producer.93 
This information problem is compounded by the fact that many food 
products—whether produced domestically or abroad—are sold as 
unbranded or weakly branded products in the United States.  Examples 
include fresh fruits, vegetables, and seafood, in which consumer choices 
appear to be influenced more by perceivable product characteristics than
by the identity of the producing company.  Without strong brand 
association, fresh food producers are less likely to internalize the costs of 
safety problems than brand-driven companies selling drugs, processed
foods, or consumer products.94 
Even if consumers were able to identify and sanction producers of 
unsafe food, this would be unlikely to produce a socially optimal level of 
food safety. The reason for this is simple.  Foodborne illnesses create 
externalities, so consumers do not suffer all of the harm associated with
unsafe food. The most easily identifiable externalities are lost workdays, 
resources spent on medical care, and time devoted to care of the sick
person by friends and relatives.95  Accordingly, a combination of market 
92. Mitchell, supra note 90, at 10, 12. 
93. Id. at 15 (citing JEAN C. BUZBY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PRODUCT 
LIABILITY AND MICROBIAL FOODBORNE ILLNESS 15 (2001), available at http://www.ers.
usda.gov/publications/aer799/aer799.pdf (reporting that, over the ten-year period
studied, consumers won only one-third of jury trials in food poisoning cases)). 
94. Grocery store chains have diversified product lines, so public outcry against a 
particular product may not represent the same threat to future revenue as loss of public 
confidence in a key brand.  The consuming public appears to accept that grocery stores—and
to some degree, restaurants—do not have control over their entire supply chains.  In a 
relatively sophisticated manner, consumers harshly penalize companies whose food safety
problems are shown to result at least in part from their own internal procedures.  However,
consumers appear to be more lenient with grocery stores that sell products contaminated 
earlier in the supply chain. Compare Business Brief: Foodmaker Sees Loss For Fiscal
2nd Period Related to Illnesses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1993, at B4 (discussing short-term 
fallout of e. coli crisis at Jack in the Box restaurants), and Mark Veverka, Savvy Helps
Jack in the Box Weather Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1997, at CA1 (discussing longer-
term implications of e. coli crisis on parent company of Jack in the Box restaurants) with
FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE, U.S. GROCERY SHOPPER TRENDS: 2009 94-98, 100 (2009)
(reporting study results indicating that, despite a 2009 outbreak involving nuts sold in 
grocery stores, consumer confidence in the safety level of grocery stores was “still much 
higher than the trust consumers place in safety at restaurants”).
95. Mitchell, supra note 90, at 12. 
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sanctions and tort law is likely to result in a level of food safety below 
the socially optimal level.96 
For imported food, the information problems that reduce the effectiveness 
of market mechanisms and tort liability systems continue to apply.
Additionally, multinational cases present two additional problems that
further reduce the incentive effects of tort liability.
First, legal rules make it far more difficult to recover from a foreign 
company in a tort suit than from a comparable domestic company.
These rules include personal jurisdiction and evidentiary requirements
that have a disparate impact on cases with foreign elements.  Personal 
jurisdiction requirements are standards rather than rules, so their effect is
difficult to predict in any individual case.  However, they do permit
courts to conclude that they lack jurisdiction over foreign defendants 
with insufficient connections to the United States.97 Because U.S.
producers can always be sued in at least one state, there is an element of
jurisdictional uncertainty to suits against foreign producers that does not 
exist in comparable domestic cases. Moreover, even when jurisdiction 
can be obtained, foreign defendants may be able to take advantage of 
protective local regulatory structures to disappear, perhaps transferring
their assets to another entity or reincorporating under another name.98 
96. To whatever extent punitive damages make up for this in the domestic context, 
they are likely to be less effective with respect to food produced abroad.  The same
jurisdictional and evidentiary hurdles that make it difficult to get a judgment against a 
foreign defendant will also reduce the degree to which the threat of punitive damages
affects foreign incentives.  Moreover, many foreign states assert a public policy against punitive
damages and may make it exceptionally difficult to gather evidence for any case in which 
punitive damages are a risk.
97. Personal jurisdiction case law suggests that foreign defendants in civil litigation
have two significant defenses to jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.  First, foreign defendants may not be subject to personal jurisdiction if 
they did not take actions “purposefully directed” toward the United States.  See Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion).  Second, sufficiently attenuated connections between the defendant 
and the United States may make jurisdiction “unreasonable[],” id. at 114 (majority opinion),
such that it “offend[s] traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” id. at 113 
(internal quotations omitted).  C.f. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality 
and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1219–23 (1992) (suggesting
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause may make similar defenses available to
defendants faced with extraterritorial application of federal law).
98. Cf. Don Lee & Abigail Goldman, Factory Linked to Tainted Pet Food Found
Closed, SEATTLE TIMES, May 11, 2007, at A12 (stating that Chinese factory linked to
2007 pet foot scandal was bulldozed by its owner days before FDA investigators arrived); 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Transcript of FDA Press Conference on Contaminated
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Similarly, evidentiary rules limit the conditions under which foreign 
evidence can be admitted in U.S. courts.  These rules impose costs and 
procedural requirements not applicable in the domestic context.99  Given 
these hurdles, a rational plaintiff will require a higher expected recovery100 
to bring a case against a foreign producer than against a U.S. producer.101 
Second, the social and environmental context in many exporting 
countries increases the likelihood that imported food will present safety
concerns. As recent events in China indicate, nascent business norms in
developing countries may not be sufficient to prevent intentional 
adulteration of a type that is much rarer in brand-conscious—and in the 
case of the United States, litigious—developed countries.102 Rapid 
industrial development has left many areas of developing countries with
unclean water and contaminated soil.103  To the extent food safety and
environmental regulations exist in developing countries, they are less
likely to be enforced.  Moreover, many developing countries have rampant 
corruption problems, and it may be economically rational, at least in the 
short term, for producers to pay bribes rather than comply with more 
expensive regulations.  These corruption problems are compounded when
Animal Feed (May 10, 2007) (statement of Walter Batts, Deputy Director of the Office 
of International Programs), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/UCM123611.pdf (indicating that two Chinese facilities 
FDA visited had been “closed down” and had their “machinery dismantled” before FDA 
investigators arrived). 
99. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (2006) (transmittal of letter rogatory or request); id.
§ 1783 (2006) (subpoena of person in foreign country); FED. R. EVID. 902(3)
(authentication of foreign public documents); FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b) (depositions in foreign 
countries); Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.  See generally GARY BORN &
PETER RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 907–1007 (4th ed. 
2007) (discussing the special problems associated with obtaining evidence abroad for use 
in U.S. court).
100. By expected recovery, I mean simply the value of the potential award multiplied by
the likelihood of recovery. 
101. The procedural difficulties involved in suing foreign manufacturers alter 
manufacturer incentives much the way that nineteenth-century privity requirements did. 
Compare Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404–05 (Exch. Div.)
(applying privity requirement to hold that coach manufacturer was not liable to coach
driver with whom he had not directly done business), with MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053–55 (N.Y. 1916) (abandoning privity requirement and discussing
effects of change on manufacturer incentives).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11 (discussing milk adulteration). 
103. Of course, these areas exist in developed countries as well. However, in 
developed countries they are more likely to have been identified and either blocked from 
use in food production or subjected to cleanup programs. 
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they interact with domestic governance structures that tie the evaluation
of regional officials to the rate of economic growth in their region.104 
2. Discriminatory Regulation 
Together, the information problems associated with food safety, the 
legal rules applicable to international litigation, and the social and
environmental context in food-exporting countries suggest that a 
combination of market incentives and tort law does not guarantee a 
socially optimal level of safety for imported food.  One possible way to 
correct this market failure is through ex ante regulation; another option 
is ex post liability.  Part IV, below, examines three potential approaches 
to ex ante regulation.  The ex post option has been developed in detail 
elsewhere105 and will not be a primary focus of the discussion below. 
To address the ex post option briefly, a recent article suggests that the
way to correct market failures associated with imported products is to
impose strict liability and heightened penalties on U.S. importers, forcing
them to “act as de facto regulators” of foreign production processes.106 
Although this proposal could increase the safety of imported products, it
also appears to raise several concerns. 
First, a regime of strict liability and heightened penalties appears to
face its own information problem.  It is difficult to know how a 
regulatory agency could determine in advance the appropriate penalty to
deter safety violations.  If a single enhanced penalty regime, like treble 
damages, were applied to all foreign production, it would almost 
certainly overregulate in certain areas and underregulate in others.  This 
could perhaps be ameliorated by moving to individual penalty regimes 
for particular product sectors or even individual products, but with each 
104. See Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, Internal 
Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 325, 
351 (2010) (noting that “local officials [in China] are evaluated primarily on their ability
to deliver sustained economic growth”).  This type of incentive structure will obviously
be a disincentive to enforcing regulations that interfere with economic growth.
105. Bamberger & Guzman, supra note 34, at 1411–13; see also Tom Baker, Bonded
Import Safety Warranties, in  IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 215, 216–24 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009); Kenneth A. Bamberger &
Andrew T. Guzman, Importers as Regulators: Product Safety in a Globalized World, in 
IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra, at 193, 
195–96 [hereinafter Bamberger & Guzman, Importers as Regulators].
106. Bamberger & Guzman, supra note 34, at 1409. 
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increase in specificity the approach would bear an increasing 
resemblance to tariff schedules.  Whether set by statute or regulation, these
penalty schedules would, like tariffs themselves, be subject to short-term
political meddling and protectionist impulses.  Moreover, their functional 
similarity to tariffs would likely pose a significant risk of successful
WTO challenges.107 
Second, a regime of strict liability and heightened penalties is likely to 
shift resources inefficiently to domestic production.  Food is a product 
category in which risks can be mitigated but not removed.  Under a strict
liability/heightened penalty approach, a domestic firm can choose between 
buying domestically produced green onions and facing standard tort
liability or buying foreign-produced green onions and facing heightened 
penalties. Even if the foreign green onions can be produced more 
cheaply at a given level of safety, the firm will choose to purchase domestic
green onions because its downside risks are much lower if a problem
does occur. This result will help domestic green onion growers but will 
result in a deadweight social loss. 
Third, moving to a strict liability/heightened penalty regime would 
likely result in a radical restructuring of the domestic import industry.
Heightened penalties would make it more difficult for small importers to 
operate, and they would be forced either to combine into larger entities 
or purchase insurance against the penalties.108  Insurance companies
might develop their own ways of rating the risk of particular producers 
or regions.109 Although this type of industry restructuring is not necessarily 
bad, it is a significant change that could have unexpected ramifications. 
Fourth, a strict liability/heightened penalty regime will still need to 
overcome the basic information problem of ex post regulation. Unless 
an importing firm or insurance company knows for which potential 
contaminants to test, it will be forced to find some way to conduct its 
own ex ante regulation of production processes overseas.110  This  may  
result in the creation of private entities similar in function to those that 
would be created under a delegated regulation strategy.111  However, the
107. But see id. at 1439–42 (arguing that a regime of strict liability and heightened
penalties would survive WTO scrutiny because it is necessary to protect a vital state 
interest in safety regulation and is the least restrictive alternative available).  On the relationship 
between WTO rules and safety regulation, see infra Part VI. 
108. See Baker, supra note 105, at 229–30l; Bamberger & Guzman, supra note 34,
at 1433 (discussing possible role of insurance industry); Bamberger & Guzman, Importers as
Regulators, supra note 105, at 205.
109. See Baker, supra note 105, at 229–30. 
110. See supra Part III.B.1.
111. See Bamberger & Guzman, supra note 34, at 1433.
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more circuitous route that a strict liability/heightened penalty regime
uses to reach this result may introduce the possibility for additional 
market failures.
Overall, strict liability and heightened penalties is one potential approach 
to import safety problems.  However, it raises its own concerns— and it
may be less likely to survive WTO challenges than some ex ante strategies. 
IV. REGULATING BEHAVIORS ABROAD
A. Three Regulatory Strategies 
To the extent a country seeks to include an ex ante component in its 
regulation of foreign-produced goods, there are three basic strategies for 
regulatory enforcement: (1) direct extraterritorial regulation; (2) delegation 
to a foreign government agency; and (3) delegation to a domestic or 
foreign private entity.  All three of these strategies play a significant role 
in the food safety bills currently under consideration in the U.S. Congress. 
1. Direct Extraterritorial Regulation 
Direct extraterritorial regulation involves direct employment of 
inspectors by the government of the importing country. This could either
mean hiring citizens of the importing country or some third country and
sending them to the exporting country, or hiring citizens of the exporting
country to work in their homeland.  As discussed further in Part V.A, the 
characteristics of the direct regulatory program may vary significantly 
between these options. 
2. Delegation to a Private Entity 
Delegation to a private entity involves a government decision to require
some type of certification by a private entity as a condition to market 
entry.  This approach requires the regulating government to develop a 
program to accredit and supervise third-party certifiers.  In essence, the
government chooses to focus its attention on a group of private regulators 
rather than on the regulated industry itself.  As a matter of institutional 
design, the basic feature of delegation to a private entity is a change from
a principal-agent relationship between government and on-the-ground 
regulator to a principal-agent-subagent relationship between government, 
private entity, and on-the-ground regulator. 
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3. Delegation to a Foreign Government Agency 
Delegation to a foreign government agency involves a government 
decision to rely explicitly on a foreign government’s regulatory structure.
This can involve either formal finding of equivalence—USDA’s
approach to meat, egg, and poultry imports—or a requirement that the 
exporting country certify that particular export shipments (or exports 
from certain companies, industries, or regions) meet regulatory
requirements in the importing country.  As a matter of institutional 
design, the basic feature of delegation to a foreign government agency is 
a principal-double agent-subagent relationship between the importing
government, the foreign agency and the on-the-ground regulator.  As 
discussed further in Part V.C, the fact that the foreign government
agency has a second principal—its political superiors in the foreign 
government—can introduce significant complications for this regulatory 
strategy. 
B. Two Pending Bills
As of this writing, Congress is considering two versions of a major 
food safety bill.  The U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 2749,
the Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, in July 2009.112  The  U.S.  
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions reported 
S. 510, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, to the full Senate in
November 2009.113  The Senate, which has been focused on health care 
reform,114 has—as of this writing—yet to act on S. 510.  However, the 
bills appear to have broad congressional and administration support.  It 
is not unrealistic to anticipate that a major food safety law could be 
passed by Congress and signed by the President during the 111th Congress.115 
112. See Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2749 (last visited May
18, 2010). 
113. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-510 (last visited May
18, 2010). 
114. See generally Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
115. High profile reports of safety problems with both domestic and imported food 
products have galvanized public opinion, with much of the attention focused on safety
issues in products produced in China. Outside the United States, the sheer scope of harm 
caused by contaminated infant formula in China—nearly 300,000 persons sickened, over 
50,000 hospitalized—has served as a stark reminder that harm from adulterated food is 
not necessarily limited to tens or hundreds of people. MORRISON, supra note 6, at 10 
(citing Chinese government reports of 51,900 people hospitalized); cf. NASSIM NICHOLAS 
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Both bills rely on all three of the ex ante regulatory strategies discussed
above. Provisions increasing U.S. reliance on direct extraterritorial 
regulation include those providing for explicit extraterritorial application
of the FFDCA,116 a dedicated foreign inspectorate,117 annual or biennial
registration of foreign food facilities,118 direct inspection of foreign 
facilities,119 refusal of imports from facilities that refuse or delay
inspection,120 foreign FDA offices,121 enhanced access to records,122 and 
broad subpoena authority.123 
Provisions increasing U.S. reliance on delegation to domestic and 
foreign private entities include those providing for mandatory registration of
importers,124 mandatory registration of customs brokers,125 mandatory 
importer verification of their suppliers’ compliance with U.S. food 
safety laws,126 accreditation of private entities to certify compliance with 
U.S. food safety laws,127 and expedited processing for importers who 
demonstrate enhanced control over their supply chains.128 
Provisions increasing U.S. reliance on delegation to a foreign
government agency include those providing for foreign government 
inspections to satisfy risk-based inspection schedules,129 FDA determination 
of whether foreign regulatory systems can provide assurances of safety
levels equivalent to the U.S. system,130 and accreditation of foreign 
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, at xvii–xxiv (2007)
(arguing that unexpected events and extreme outlier situations drive history); Daniel A. 
Farber, Uncertainty 19–23 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Public Law Research Paper No. 
1555343), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1555343 (discussing 
the policy implications of probability distributions where “tail thickness” is uncertain).  Public
opinion polls report decreasing trust in the safety of the nation’s food supply, and a heavily
Democratic Congress appears ready to move in a more proregulatory direction on consumer
safety issues. 
116. H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § 312 (2009). 
117. Id. § 208. 
118. Id. § 101; S. 510, 111th Cong. § 102 (2009). 
119. H.R. 2749 § 207; S. 510 § 307. 
120. H.R. 2749 § 207. 
121. S. 510 § 309. 
122. H.R. 2749 § 106. 
123. Id. § 211. 
124. Id. § 204. 
125. Id. § 205. 
126. S. 510 § 301. 
127. H.R. 2749 § 109; S. 510 § 308. 
128. H.R. 2749 § 113; S. 510 § 302. 
129. H.R. 2749 § 105. 
130. S. 510 § 305. 
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government agencies to certify compliance with U.S. food safety 
laws.131 
Other provisions require FDA to set standards that could be enforced
under one or more of the three regulatory strategies. These include 
promulgation of performance standards for particular foods or food 
categories,132 promulgation of safety standards for produce and certain
other agricultural products,133 mandatory implementation of management-
based regulatory programs,134 mandatory risk-based facility inspection 
schedules,135 traceability requirements,136 country-of-origin labeling,137 and 
promulgation of regulations for good importer practices.138 
C. Three Principal-Agent Problems
Principal-agent problems are a fundamental part of government 
activity.  The incentives of the agent, the government employee, will 
rarely align perfectly with those of his or her ultimate principal, the 
ordinary citizen.  However, principal-agent problems have a special 
relevance for efforts to regulate foreign activity—where agency problems
are presented that go beyond those in an equivalent domestic regulatory
situation. 
1. The Regulatory License Problem 
In his work on the credit ratings industry, Professor Frank Partnoy has 
proposed the “regulatory license” as a way of understanding the 
consequences of giving legal effect to the ratings decisions of a private
entity.139  When its rating does not have a legal effect, the ability of a
private agency to make money rests on its “reputational capital.”140  The
agency must cultivate a reputation for reliable, accurate ratings in order 
to survive. Classic examples of ratings entities that survive at least in 
131. H.R. 2749 § 109; S. 510 § 308. 
132. H.R. 2749 § 103; S. 510 § 104. 
133. H.R. 2749 § 104; S. 510 § 105. 
134. H.R. 2749 § 102; S. 510 §§ 103, 106.  Examples of management-based regulatory
programs include hazard analysis, preventative controls, and food defense programs, as well 
as associated recordkeeping requirements.  H.R. 2749 § 102; S. 510 §§ 103, 106. 
135. H.R. 2749 § 105. 
136. Id. § 107; S. 510 §§ 204–205. 
137. H.R. 2749 § 202. 
138. Id. § 204. 
139. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Ratings Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 682–86 (1999). 
140. Id. at 682. 
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part on reputational capital are Consumer Union, which publishes 
Consumer Reports magazine,141 and Good Housekeeping, which confers
the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.142 
However, once the ratings of a private entity or other third party are 
given legal effect, the incentives facing that entity change.  The entity is
in effect selling a license to participate in the market. Although it 
previously had the incentive to keep its reputation high, it now has the 
incentive to maximize profit so long as it does not lose its right to sell
the regulatory license.143  This type of profit maximization may lead the
entity to take reputation-reducing actions—such as issuing poor quality
ratings—that it would not take if it relied solely on its reputational
capital to justify its fees.144 
At a macro level, regulatory license analysis suggests that the more
important a private entity’s regulatory role becomes, the more it will
face incentives to maximize profit or revenue at the expense of high 
quality decisions.  This in turn means governments choosing to rely on
third-party monitoring will need to devote additional resources to
“watching the watchdogs.” This, of course, limits the benefits of relying 
on delegated authority in the first place.
2. Interest Group Capture 
The addition of a separate entity between the government and the on-
the-ground regulator presents an additional set of interest group capture 
problems.  In any regulatory situation, there is a risk that private interests
may capture the relevant government agency.  However, inserting a 
private entity as a middleman effectively gives the regulated industry an 
additional opportunity to capture its regulator.
141. See id. at 685. 
142. Both of these entities also survive, in part, on magazine subscriptions; Consumers
Union also accepts donations. See generally Consumers Union, About Us, http://www.
consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/overview/index.htm (last visited May 18, 2010).
But the viability of both magazines and the ability of Consumers Union to collect donations 
rest on reputational capital. 
143. Partnoy, supra note 139, at 684. 
144. Id.  If that entity is a for-profit entity, it will be incentivized to conduct its 
regulatory functions so as to maximize its own profits rather than social welfare.  If the 
entity is a nonprofit organization, it will still have incentives to maximize revenue, which 
it can then distribute to its own leadership through salaries and perks. 
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In particular, there is a risk anytime the targets of regulations are
paying, either directly or indirectly, for the privilege of being inspected.
The effects of these payments will vary based on the manner in which
they are assessed.145  However, some general observations can be made.
First, any entity—public or private—will seek to spend less money per
inspection than it receives in fees for that inspection.  If fees are set by 
the government at below cost, inspection quality will go down to the 
level that can be justified by the fees generated.
Second, there is a risk that the inspection entity will adopt a “[he] who
pays the piper calls the tune”146 approach and begin to see the subject of 
regulation, rather than the government agency responsible for supervising 
the inspection entity, as its “principal.”  This is obviously a risk with 
private for-profit entities and may also be a problem with nonprofit entities 
and foreign government agencies.147  However, the “piper” problem is
almost certain to be more severe in situations in which regulated parties
have a choice among regulators.148  For example, it appears that
competition for business among credit rating agencies played at least
some role in the ratings decisions those agencies issued.149 
3. Bribery and Threats of Violence 
Bribery is a tremendous problem in many food-exporting countries. 
For example, Mexico, China, and Thailand are the second, third, and
fourth largest suppliers of agricultural and seafood imports to the United 
145. They could, for example, be assessed per inspection, per facility over X time period, 
or by quantity or monetary value of goods inspected. 
146. See generally OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2010), http://dictionary.
oed.com (enter “piper,” and click “Find Word”) (last visited Apr. 27, 2010) (“[W]ho
pays the piper calls the tune . . . : whoever pays the cost of an activity [or] undertaking . . . has
control over it.”).
147. Nonprofit entities are not immune to self-dealing risks.  One high profile example 
is the massive pay package and perks Richard Grasso received as head of the then-
nonprofit New York Stock Exchange. See Grasso’s Big Board: How To Make Money on 
the Stock Exchange, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2007, at 2. 
148. Similar phenomena have been observed in situations where parties have a 
choice among adjudicators. Cf. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 33 (1996) (arguing that international arbitrators compete for business by
cultivating a reputation for a certain type of “virtue”); JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL, HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 250
(2009) (discussing competition for business among the English courts between the fifteenth 
and seventeenth centuries). 
149. See infra note 168. 
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States.150  Transparency International considers all of these to be countries
with a “serious corruption problem in the public sector,”151 and anecdotal
reports of routine bribery in these countries are common.  This suggests 
that a major source of principal-agent problems will be the ability of 
supervisors to prevent bribe taking by inspectors in the field. 
The flip side of the bribery problem is the threat that nonfavorable 
inspection outcomes will result in harm to the inspector and those close 
to the inspector. This principal-agent problem is also endemic to many 
food-exporting countries and has the same structure as the bribery
problem.  The primary distinction is that self-dealing by the agent is used to
prevent losses rather than achieve gains.  In practice, the two may occur
together—“accept this money or I’ll break your kneecaps.” 
V. APPLICATION
A. Direct Extraterritorial Regulation 
1. Principal-Agent Problems 
One direction for reform efforts is direct extraterritorial regulation— 
traditional regulation applied abroad.  Direct regulation largely eliminates 
the regulatory license problem, at least from the perspective of the
regulating government, because no separate entity is given the right to 
“sell” a license to participate in the market.  It also involves less interest 
group capture risk than the alternative regulatory strategies.  Although it 
remains possible to capture the regulating agency in the importing 
150. BECKER, supra note 66, at 2 tbl.1.  Canada, a country with fewer corruption problems, 
is the largest supplier. Id.
 151. Transparency Int’l, 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index: Regional Highlights: 
Asia-Pacific, http://www.transparency.org/layout/set/print/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/ 
2008/regional_highlights_factsheets (noting that a score “below 5” indicates “a serious
corruption problem in the public sector”); see also Transparency Int’l, 2008 Corruption
Perceptions Index: Regional Highlights: Americas, http://www.transparency.org/layout/set/
print/policy _research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008/regional_highlights_factsheets. China and
Mexico each had a score of 3.6; Thailand had a score of 3.5. Transparency Int’l,
Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/
2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table. China and Mexico tied with several other countries for 72nd
place on the 2008 Corruptions Perceptions Index; Thailand tied with several others for 
80th. Id.  The United States had a score of 7.7 and tied with the United Kingdom for a
ranking of 16th. Id. Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden topped the list as the countries
with the lowest perceived levels of corruption, with scores of 9.3. Id.
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country, this may be a relatively difficult task for foreign producers.152 
However, with respect to bribery and threats of violence, direct regulation
leads to a counterintuitive result. The standard story is that a principal has
more control over an employee than an independent contractor.153 
However, the social and political dynamics of extraterritorial regulation 
may severely limit the ability of an importing government to control
bribery and threats of violence.
Consider the following.  Unless a program of direct regulation is very 
small, it is unlikely to be able to rely solely on importing-country citizens as 
inspection staff.  Importing-country citizens will almost certainly demand
higher wages than citizens of many exporting countries, where prevailing 
wage rates are lower.  Importing-country citizen wage demands are likely to
be higher under many of the working conditions that would likely be 
included in a food inspection job located in a developing country.  Many
of these would be considered hardship locations, with significant health-
related environmental problems, limited school facilities for children, and 
few employment opportunities for significant others.  The basic job of 
inspection would almost certainly require travel in rural areas, where
poor quality roads and different driving norms could lead to high accident
rates that might justify hazard pay.  The high wage rates likely demanded
by importing-country citizen inspectors would combine with the inherent 
disadvantages that face any outsider taking on this type of role. Although 
some importing-country citizens would have, or be able to acquire, the 
relevant language skills, their ability to obtain relevant information would 
likely be less than that of native speakers familiar with local cultural 
154norms. 
Accordingly, a program of direct regulation would likely involve the 
importing government supervising an inspection staff composed of 
citizens of the exporting country.  These persons will be subject to similar
social and cultural pressures as others operating in a high-corruption 
society.  Unless an individual from a relatively low-corruption country is 
152. For example, foreign producers may be more limited in their ability to make 
campaign contributions than domestic producers or secure the appointment former employees
as regulators in the importing country. 
153. For example, this is part of the test the U.S. Internal Revenue Service uses in 
determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor.  See 
generally Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 3121 (explaining that a high degree of control 
over an individual’s behavior suggests that an individual is an employee rather than an 
independent contractor); I.R.S. Pub. 15-A, at 6–8 (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf (same). 
154. This might be particularly true in rural areas, where most food production is likely
to place.
404
MUCHMORE FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES1 (POST-AUTHOR PAGES) 7/19/2010 9:16 AM     
  

























[VOL. 47:  371, 2010] Private Regulation and Foreign Conduct
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
sent to accompany the local inspectors on each field inspection, negating 
much of the cost advantage of local staff, direct employment of local
inspectors by the importing government would not appear to address this
information problem.  In other words, the primary advantage of direct 
regulation—formal control of local inspectors—appears to be of relatively 
limited value in preventing bribery.
Moreover, a direct regulation program will likely be more limited in 
its ability to take action when it does discover a corruption problem.
When an importing government is a direct employer of local inspectors, 
its personnel decisions can easily take on diplomatic ramifications. 
Although the decision to fire a single inspector may be unlikely to lead
to an international crisis, experience with police departments suggests
that corruption problems frequently become pervasive throughout an
organization. It is not difficult to imagine that an importing government 
could feel constrained in its ability to fire a group of inspectors in, say,
an economically depressed region of China. 
Beyond firing, the importing government would also be limited in its
ability to invoke criminal sanctions for bribery and threats.  Extraterritorial 
criminal prosecutions of foreign nationals have historically carried
significant political costs.  Accordingly, an importing government may
in practice be limited to turning its foreign employees over to local
authorities for prosecution. Even this option has obvious problems. In 
particular, it would likely involve importing-country government employees 
testifying against their former coworkers in a criminal case in the exporting 
country—with the not-unlikely prospect of local courts concluding that
the relevant allegation had not been proven.  Of course, these prospects 
are not a bar to a direct regulation program, but they must be factored
into a calculation of its total costs.
2. Other Problems 
In addition to principal-agent problems, a program of direct regulation 
carries other significant costs. First, a significant problem with direct
regulation is the simple fact that on-the-ground regulators are employees 
of the importing government.155  Their actions may be legally attributable to
the importing government and will almost certainly be considered 
155. Similar problems would arise if they were direct contractors for the U.S. 
government, subject to detailed control by U.S. government employees. 
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attributable to the importing government by citizens of the exporting 
country.  Accidents and abuses of authority are likely to take place in
any regulatory program, and the direct involvement of the government 
may make them more difficult to resolve. 
Second, funding is a substantial practical obstacle to a government-run 
program of foreign production process regulation.  A program of direct
extraterritorial regulation would have to be paid for either directly by the 
taxpayer in the importing country or through some system of overt user 
fees on the food import industry.  Direct funding of a large-scale program 
appears to be a nonstarter in the current fiscal situation.  However, user 
fees on the food import industry would likely fail under WTO rules 
unless similar fees were imposed on domestic producers.156  This leaves
a large outlay by the taxpayer in the importing country as the only way
to fund a system of direct extraterritorial regulation.157 
Moreover, to the extent that direct extraterritorial regulation is funded 
by the importing-country taxpayer—or in any manner that does not 
increase the price of imported products—it in effect provides an
incentive for exporting countries to avoid developing their own domestic 
regulatory structures.  In addition to reducing the price of imported food 
vis-à-vis domestically produced food, it would likely become a self-
perpetuating policy.  So long as the importing-country taxpayer is paying to
make sure goods imported from China are safe, Chinese authorities have 
no incentive to spend their own tax dollars on making sure the foods it 
exports are safe. This gets the proper incentive structure backward. 
Given that exports are an engine for generating economic growth and
hard currency reserves, countries rationally should be willing to provide 
some safety regulation for their export industry.  Direct regulation of
156. To the extent they were levied on food importers, they would likely be challenged
by U.S. trading partners as nontariff barriers—or even explicit tariffs—violating WTO 
national treatment requirements.  To the extent they were levied directly on foreign producers 
in particular countries, they would likely be challenged by U.S. trading partners as violating
MFN status.
 157. H.R. 2749 tries to sidestep this problem by imposing a $500 fee on all food
production facilities, whether domestic or foreign.  However, this approach—imposing an
equivalent fee on domestic and foreign facilities—still provides an incentive for foreign 
countries to avoid developing their own export safety programs.  U.S. producers pay this 
fee on top of the portion of their taxes that already go to U.S. government food safety
programs. Foreign producers pay this same fee whether or not their home country
devotes significant tax resources to food export safety—Chinese producers pay the same 
$500 fee that French producers do. Moreover, with respect to this specific bill, the 
Congressional Budget Office has estimated that this $500 fee would fall $2.2 billion
short of the revenue needed to fund the inspection programs that H.R. 2749 requires. 
Jane Zhang, House Passes Bill Giving FDA More Oversight of Food Safety, WALL ST. J., 
July 31, 2009, at A3. 
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products produced in an underregulating country is likely to be a self-
perpetuating policy with negative implications for both the economic 
growth rate and the trade balance in the importing country.
Third, direct regulation creates numerous logistical problems.  Food
production processes are widely dispersed.  Food production typically
begins with farming, ranching, or fishing operations.  In developed 
countries, many of these operations are done on a large scale, with smaller
scale operators moving increasingly toward higher-end products aimed
at a particular market niche, such as high quality, environmental
sustainability, or humane treatment of animals.  In developing countries,
however, many lower-end food products are produced by widely dispersed 
small-scale operators and later consolidated by a processor or packer.
The sheer scope of these foreign food production processes suggests that
there would be significant financial costs associated with any effort at
direct extraterritorial regulation.  Moreover, given that safety issues are
different for each product category and subcategory,158 there are reasons
to doubt that managing such a program centrally would lead to
economies of scale.
B. Delegation to Private Entity 
1. Generally 
A second direction for reform efforts is delegation to private entities. 
Delegation to a private entity introduces regulatory license problems not 
present in direct regulation. It also introduces an additional level of
interest group capture risks because an interest group can capture either
the supervisory agency in the importing government or the relevant 
private entity.159  However, it should make it easier to deal with the
principal-agent problem least effectively addressed by direct regulation: 
the problem of bribery and threats. 
In some ways, delegated regulation can be thought of as a compromise 
approach. It both introduces an intermediary between the importing 
158. For example, green onion growing operations present different safety issues
than wheat fields or oyster beds. Moreover, the set of risks applicable in Mexico or Canada
may be different from those applicable in China.
159. This may make it easier to capture a subset of the regulatory program—such as 
the entity accrediting a particular industry or region—but more difficult to capture the full
regulatory program for a particular country.
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government and on-the-ground regulators and avoids a supervisory 
relationship between the importing government and a foreign government 
agency.  These two features together reduce many of the diplomatic risks
associated with either direct regulation or delegation to a foreign 
government agency.  However, it also presents risks of private sector
rent-seeking not present in the other approaches.
Delegation to a private entity also has several other features that may 
explain the recent interest it has generated.  For example, it could permit
an importing government to institute a program of foreign production 
process regulation without having to undertake day-to-day management
of on-the-ground regulators.  It would also permit ex ante regulation of
production processes without direct employment of a large number of 
foreign staffers and the many complexities that could result.160  A private
entity could have significant freedom to fire corrupt or incompetent
employees.161  And delegation to a private entity may, though this is far
from clear, make it possible to institute an industry-funded regulatory 
program in a manner that does not lead to trade disputes.162 
2. Adjusting Incentives
Delegation to a private entity is also exciting as a regulatory proposal 
because it is takes a top-down approach to creating private sector
regulatory bodies that does not appear to have been tried previously on a 
large scale. Although private sector regulators play a substantial role in 
the United States,163 most or all existing private sector regulators developed 
from the bottom up.  Regulatory structures such as the securities industry
self-regulatory organizations, the credit ratings companies, the higher 
education accreditation bodies, and organic-status certification providers 
existed before government regulation in these fields.  When political or 
other reasons led the government to take on some regulatory role, it did 
so by giving official sanction to the decisions of these private sector
organizations. 
160. For example: Are foreign employees agents of the U.S. government for purposes of 
tort liability? Does sovereign immunity apply to regulatory activities of the U.S. government 
abroad? Do their actions constitute state actions?  Should they have U.S. government
email addresses? Should they have any other access to, say, FDA computer systems?
161. Indeed, the very absence of U.S. control over the operations of the foreign entity
would give it operational flexibility not possible with direct regulation.
162. See infra Part VI.  The precise relationship between a delegated regulation regime 
and WTO rules is beyond the scope of this paper.
163. See supra Part II.A.4.
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For those who believe there is a social benefit to relying on these 
private regulatory bodies rather than similar government structures, it is 
natural to ask whether effective private regulators can be developed 
through top-down government action.  In other words, is it possible for a 
government to deliberately create a socially beneficial private regulation
industry? 
It is not surprising that interest in private regulators has been particularly 
strong when tied to conduct that occurs, at least in part, in a foreign
country.  In recent decades, several private organizations have developed
thriving regulatory regimes that do not rely on a delegation of state 
authority.  Instead, they rely on control of some type of claim in product 
labeling or advertising—often registered as a certification mark—to require
parties to conform to specific behavioral requirements.164 
Many questions remain about how effective these certification mark 
regimes are at enforcing their requirements.  However, they have already
generated a substantial academic literature and appear to have at least
some influence on behavior in particular industries. 
It is, of course, an empirical question whether the benefits associated 
with a government-created private regulatory structure would exceed the
costs. Moreover, the absence of real-world examples suggests that
empirical work on this issue is not yet possible.  Accordingly, it may be 
premature to consider broad implementation of a delegated regulation 
regime.  Instead, it may be more productive to focus on understanding 
the ways that the principal-agent problems associated with delegation to 
a private entity can be reduced.  This might make it possible to avoid 
unnecessary mistakes in setting up a smaller scale pilot program.
a. The Regulatory License Problem 
There are at least two possible ways to address the regulatory license
problem.  The first would be by delegating to a single private organization 
that would in effect have monopoly power; the second would be by 
creating a small group of competing organizations. 
164. See supra note 33.  A significant third-party certification industry has developed in
response to market pressures and legal risk associated with international business.  See 
generally Blair et al., supra note 33, at 330–34.  On the relationship between certification 
marks and the trademark registration system, see Manta, supra note 33, at 402–04. 
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The first approach, creating a private monopoly, appears to be the 
more promising option.  The importing government could accredit only
a single company to cover a single product category in a particular region. 
This accreditation could be for a limited duration,165 renewable, and
under some degree of regulatory supervision.  The accredited company 
would have a monopoly on regulatory licenses and would be able to earn
monopoly profits, perhaps with some upper limit set by regulation.
Because the license would, in practice, be an entitlement to a future income
stream, the company holding the entitlement would have a strong incentive
to keep the importing government satisfied with its performance.
In this monopoly situation, there would be one key distinction from 
the regulatory license problem in the credit rating industry.  In that 
industry, there have for long periods of time been only three Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs), each of which
has received a “no action” letter from the SEC through a somewhat
opaque process.166  Moreover, it does not appear that the SEC ever revoked 
one of these no action letters regarding NRSRO status.167 Indeed, 
because the basis for this no action letter was that the particular credit 
rating agency was “nationally recognized,” it is not clear whether the 
SEC would have had statutory authority to revoke this designation
absent some dramatic change in the credit rating agency’s reputation. 
Accordingly, a first problem with the NRSRO system was that there was
165. This time period might be six months or one year at the beginning of such a
program.
166. As of late 2002, a U.S. Senate committee found at least 8 federal statutes, 47 
federal regulations, and 100 state laws and regulations that relied on NRSRO ratings. 
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON:
THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 102 (Comm. Print 2002).  Credit ratings are
also frequently used to trigger particular obligations in private contracts.  Id. at 29.
Despite its substantive importance, the SEC for three decades relied on the NRSRO 
concept without formally defining the term.  Instead, agency staff developed an informal
process by which it would issue “no action” letters to firms seeking to issue ratings that
would satisfy regulatory NRSRO requirements.  MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT OF 2006, at 1–2 (2006); see also
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 9–10 (2003).  After several 
unsuccessful reform efforts, both credit-rating agency and NRSRO were finally defined 
by statute in 2006.  Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291,
§ 3(a), 120 Stat. 1327, 1328.  Credit rating agencies wishing to be recognized as NRSROs 
were required to register with the SEC, and the agency was given general rulemaking 
authority to regulate NRSROs but not the methods by which they arrived at their ratings
decisions. Id. § 4, 120 Stat. at 1329. 
167. Cf. Lawrence J. White, Good Intentions Gone Awry: A Policy Analysis of the 
SEC’s Regulation of the Bond Rating Industry 6-7 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working 
Papers, Paper No. 69), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/69/ (summarizing 
history of the SEC’s use of the NRSRO designation). 
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no credible threat that the three main NRSROs would lose their access to 
a valuable income stream.
A second problem with the NRSRO system was that the no action 
letter was an indefinite license––the SEC was not required to revisit its 
decision on any regular basis.  On this analysis, a third potential problem 
with the NRSRO system was that the presence of some competition 
among rating companies actually reduced the quality of their ratings.
Because NRSRO status did not guarantee monopoly profits, credit rating 
agencies had to compete with each other for a limited amount of ratings
business. 
Putting aside quality customer service, the two primary ways to 
compete in such a business would be to lower prices or lower rating
standards. In a situation where you do not risk having your right to issue 
ratings revoked, lowering ratings standards is a more effective way to 
increase profits than lowering prices.  There is at least some evidence to
suggest that the NRSROs may have done this in connection with 
structured finance products.168  However, in addition to the higher prices 
it would create, there is at least one significant problem with a monopoly
approach: a threat to revoke a certification agency’s accreditation might
not be believable if there were no viable competitor to take its place. 
Should the importing government choose the limited monopoly 
approach, its largest hurdle might be maintaining a credible threat to
terminate an entity’s rights under the program.169  With no  direct  
168. Cf. Sam Jones, When Junk Was Gold––Part 2, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 
2008, at 16 (reporting that a Moody’s rating committee changed its methodology for
rating “constant proportion debt obligation[s]” in early 2007 to preserve its “triple-A” 
status after discovering that correction of a coding error would otherwise have reduced
the rating of that type of debt).
169. Problems with self-dealing by delegated regulation entities may be similar to 
the problems franchisors face in seeking to control franchisee behavior.  In both situations, a
principal seeks to control the behavior of an agent in ways that cannot be controlled
through a contract, either because they cannot be precisely determined ex ante or because
they cannot be cost effectively proven in court.  Franchisors seek to get around the limits of
incomplete contracts by structuring the relationship so that the franchisee has incentives
to (1) maximize revenue to the franchisor; and (2) avoid diluting the value of the franchise 
brand. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement
as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitutes or Complements?, in
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 315, 317–21 (Eric 
Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2002).  Franchisees are incentivized to maximize
revenue through contracts that make them the residual claimant to current franchise
revenues.  Id. at 326–37.  They are incentivized to avoid diluting the value of the franchise by
self-enforcement mechanisms that (1) give them a reasonable expectation of access to a 
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competitors, who would step in to fill the terminated entity’s regulatory
role? The answer might be to accredit entities for a relatively narrow 
product category and to seek to ensure that there are competitors in 
related categories.  If the importing government becomes dissatisfied 
with the entity accrediting shrimp aquaculture operations, the government 
can permit an entity accrediting aquaculture operations for another type 
of seafood to take its place.
An alternative approach to a government-sanctioned monopoly would 
be to set up a competition among accredited private entities.  This would
reduce the likelihood that the certification entities would be able to 
charge monopoly prices but would increase their incentives to increase 
profits by lowering their standards for certification.  It would also create
a situation in some ways uncomfortably similar to the competitive 
situation in the credit ratings industry before recent reforms. 
With either a monopoly or a regulated-competition approach, the 
importing government would need to be careful to structure the initiative 
in a manner that avoids even the appearance that the exporting country
was paying unreasonable fees.  This might require some type of rate-
setting process with participation by stakeholders in the exporting 
country, along with some avenue for those stakeholders to file complaints 
that would be taken into account in reaccreditation decisions.170 
b. Interest Group Capture 
In comparison to the regulatory license problem, adjusting incentives
for interest group capture may be relatively easy in the context of 
delegation to a private entity.  This is not to say that there are no risks of
interest group capture—only that they do not appear to be increased
substantially by the addition of a private sector entity. 
To take pending U.S. legislation as an example, both the House and 
Senate bills contain detailed conflict of interest provisions.171  Although 
minor loopholes may become apparent in actual practice, overall it 
appears that it will not be possible for anyone with a disclosed financial
interest in the industry subject to certification to have any ownership
future revenue stream; and (2) give the franchisor the right to terminate the relationship 
if the franchisee fails to comply with franchisor-specified behavior requirements. 
Id. at 329–30. 
170. This would, of course, raise the administrative costs associated with delegation
to a private entity.
171. H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § 109 (2009); S. 510, 111th Cong. § 308 (2009).  Both 
bills also require FDA to promulgate more detailed regulations on the subject.  H.R.
2749 § 109; S. 510 § 308. 
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stake or operational role in the certification entity.172 Although it is
certainly possible—in the murky world of developing country corporate 
ownership structures—for someone with an undisclosed financial interest to
become involved, this would appear to be a high-risk proposition. 
Accreditation would require the provision of substantial information to 
FDA.173 False statements are likely to be criminally punishable under
statutes prohibiting false statements to a federal official in an area of
federal jurisdiction. 
c. Bribery and Corruption 
Bribery is one area in which it may be less necessary to adjust 
incentives in regulatory regime based on delegation to a private entity.
It will be problematic under any of the three regulatory regimes, but 
delegation to a private entity can be structured to make this principal-
agent problem easier to address than under the other two strategies.
The importing government would likely want to address bribery with 
two basic steps.  First, it would need to design the process of accrediting 
and renewing the accreditation of private regulation entities to punish 
harshly any such entity whose employees are implicated in corrupt 
activities. Second, it would want to ensure that the importing government
could not directly influence hiring and firing decisions by the private 
entity. This would permit the importing government to disclaim 
responsibility for individual termination decisions by private regulation 
entities. 
C. Delegation to a Foreign Government Agency 
A third direction for reform efforts is delegation to a foreign 
government agency.  This exists in both traditional and modern forms. 
Its traditional form, which is less interesting for our purposes, is a simple
determination that the exporting government’s regulatory structures are 
equivalent to those of the importing country.  This is typically used to
permit the importing country to determine not to spend regulatory
resources on an area that the exporting country regulates adequately.174 
172. H.R. 2749 § 109; S. 510 § 308. 
173. H.R. 2749 § 109; S. 510 § 308. 
174. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing USDA determinations of equivalence). 
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The modern form looks to the foreign government agency not as an
all-purpose regulator but as a substitute for a private certification entity.
The primary example of this approach comes from the two bills 
currently pending before the U.S. Congress.  Both the House and Senate 
bills permit the accreditation of foreign government agencies as third-
party certifiers on terms roughly similar to those set out for private 
certification entities.175  This appears to be an effort to keep foreign 
governments involved in regulating the safety of their exported food
even when the country’s regulatory structure cannot be found equivalent
to that in the importing country.
This modern form of delegation to a foreign government agency raises 
concerns under each of the three key principal-agent problems.176 This
is in part because a foreign agency working on behalf of the importing 
government will almost certainly view the exporting government, rather 
than the importing government, as its primary “principal.” 
The severity of these problems will depend on whether the foreign 
government agency is permitted to charge a fee for its services.  If it is 
not permitted to charge a fee and is instead funded by general tax revenues 
of the exporting country, it will respond primarily to incentive structures 
created by the way the foreign government manages the agency.
Depending on the local political culture, these may include substantial 
problems relating to interest group capture, bribery, and threats. 
However, if the foreign government agency is permitted to charge a 
fee for its services, delegation of regulatory authority to the foreign 
agency will create a regulatory license problem.177  Because the foreign 
agency is not subject to the direction of politically responsible actors in
the importing country, where the consumer-level effects of its decisions 
will be felt, it can be expected to respond to financial incentives much
the same way that a private entity would.  Like a private entity, a foreign
agency authorized to collect a fee for certifying that a product complies 
with importing-country safety requirements will have an incentive to
maximize its own revenue. 
175. See H.R. 2749 § 109; S. 510 § 308. 
176. These problems may be specific to countries with underdeveloped regulatory
regimes, where the importing country is seeking to incentivize those countries to apply a 
higher level of regulation than they apply to their domestic food supplies.  In countries with 
developed regulatory regimes, it does not appear to create the same incentive problems 
to rely on the producing country to apply its standard food regulatory regime to products
produced for export. 
177. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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This can be expected to result in the agency lowering its standards to 
the level that permits it to take in the maximum revenue without losing 
the right to sell its regulatory license. This will be most severe if the 
fees are used to fund the agency’s own operations because the foreign 
agency’s managers will then be able to internalize many of the benefits 
of additional revenue.178  However, it should also exist to a lesser degree
in situations in which the fees generated by the agency go to general
revenues of the foreign government. 
Industry capture risks will also be relatively severe with delegation to 
a foreign government agency.  This is because reliance on a foreign 
government agency, rather than a private entity, introduces two—rather 
than one—new levels at which capture can take place.179  Because any 
foreign government agency is likely to be subject to superior political 
authority,180 would-be capturers could accomplish their goals either by 
capturing the foreign agency directly or by capturing its political masters 
in the foreign government. 
For all self-dealing and capture problems, however, there is one
fundamental difference between delegation to a private entity and
delegation to a foreign government agency.  The importing country will 
be able to exercise less control over the quality of certification decisions
issued by a foreign government agency than it would over the certification 
decisions issued by a similar private entity.  Whatever ability the importing 
country has to adjust the incentives that might affect a private entity,
these will be less powerful with respect to an agency of a foreign
government.  There are at least two reasons for this. 
178. For example, the agency’s managers could internalize the benefits in terms of
salaries, perks, bureaucratic territory, or jobs for friends and relatives.
179. This distinguishes it from delegation to foreign private entity, which introduces 
only one new level where capture can take place. 
180. This risk might be less severe if the relevant foreign government agencies had 
institutional guarantees of independence similar to those of statutorily independent agencies
in the United States.  See generally  STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 100–02 (6th ed. 2006) (describing
independent agencies).  However, there does not appear to be any reason to believe that 
genuinely independent agencies are to be assigned safety responsibility for imported food in
countries that are major sources of U.S. food imports.  Indeed, in the United States, neither 
FDA nor USDA is a statutorily independent agency.  See 21 U.S.C. § 393(d)(1) (appointment
of Commissioner of Food and Drugs); 7 U.S.C. § 2202 (appointment of Secretary of
Agriculture); see also PETER HUTT ET AL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 2007) (discussing President’s ability to remove the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs “for any or no reason”).
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First, the importing country will necessarily have less ability to sanction a
foreign government agency than a similar private entity.  To the extent
that the importing country delegates regulatory authority to a private
entity, it can effectively put that entity out of business by removing its right
to grant a regulatory license.  This is a simple, straightforward remedy to 
misbehavior by a private entity.  Although there may be some limits on 
this authority181—not least because once an entity becomes part of the
regulatory structure, it cannot easily be replaced until a substitute is 
available—the simple, on/off nature of this remedy is similar to a 
franchisor’s ability to terminate a franchise relationship.182  Although the
importing country could remove the authority of a foreign government 
agency to grant a regulatory license, this will not necessarily threaten
either the existence of the agency itself or the jobs of its employees. 
They could all easily be reassigned by the foreign government to other 
work. 
Second, any decision by the importing country to terminate a foreign
agency’s right to grant a regulatory license could have diplomatic 
ramifications.  Although this may not be particularly significant in terms 
of geopolitically and financially less influential countries, it could be
quite significant with the importing country’s key trading partners.183 
VI. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The post-WWII international trade system has opened numerous
markets to foreign-produced goods and in turn helped to make a wide 
variety of imported products available to consumers in the developed
world. However, its rules protecting market access have, perhaps 
necessarily, collateral consequences for safety regulation. Because
discriminatory safety regulations are an effective means of favoring 
domestic products over imported products, a system protecting market 
access will likely impose some limitations on safety regulation.  For the 
domestic policymaker, the challenge is to develop a regulatory scheme 
that increases product safety without leading to a WTO decision against 
181. Possibilities include limits on nonarbitrary termination that would likely be
built into the program, similar to arrangements giving a franchisee a reasonable expectation of
right to a future revenue stream during good behavior. 
182. See Lafontaine & Raynaud, supra note 169, at 329–30. 
183. For similar reasons, U.S. courts have traditionally applied the act of state 
doctrine to avoid passing on the validity of the actions of a foreign government taken on 
its own territory.  See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
427–37 (1964). 
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the importing country.184  Such a decision can have real consequences to 
the importing country because it authorizes the opposing party to impose 
retaliatory trade sanctions. 
The core WTO treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
1994 (GATT), contains two basic nondiscrimination requirements: 
(1) most favored nation (MFN) status;185 and (2) national treatment
provisions.186 Broadly speaking, the first means that any requirement 
placed on products from one WTO member must apply equally to all
WTO members.187  The second means that any requirements placed on 
imported products must apply equally to domestically produced
products.188 
For food safety regulations, these general nondiscrimination requirements
are supplemented by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).  The SPS Agreement provides 
generally that food safety measures must be necessary to protect human
health,189 based on scientific evidence190 and appropriate risk assessment,191 
not arbitrarily discriminatory,192 and no more restrictive than necessary.193 
Measures based on accepted international standards are presumed not to 
violate the SPS Agreement or the GATT.194 
Delegated regulation must be implemented with care or it risks igniting a
trade dispute. A delegated regulation regime that imposes requirements,
such as third-party certification, on all foreign producers and all domestic 
184. Although Congress has the power to violate U.S. WTO obligations under the 
last-in-time rule, these rules do appear to impose real constraints on the United States. In 
particular, the WTO dispute resolution system has made it more costly for the United 
States to ignore WTO obligations.  See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution
in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 258–60, 266 (2006). 
185. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I(1), Oct. 30, 1947, GATT 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1986). 
186. Id. art. III(4).
187. Absent some exception to the MFN provisions, this means that any requirement
applicable to milk products from China must also apply to milk products from France. 
188. Absent some exception to the national treatment provisions, this means that any
requirement applicable to foreign-produced green onions must also apply to domestically- 
produced green onions. 
189. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2(1),
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement. 
190. Id. art. 2(2).
191. Id. art. 5. 
192. Id. art. 2(3).
193. Id. art. 2(2).
194. Id. art. 3(2). 
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producers for a particular product category would not violate MFN or 
national treatment requirements.  However, once a state seeks to exempt
domestic producers—perhaps because they are heavily regulated 
through domestic law—other states may object that this violates national 
treatment obligations.195 Similarly, once a state attempts to exempt foreign 
producers in a particular set of countries, such as those with highly 
developed domestic regulatory systems, a nonexempt state may object 
that this violates MFN status. 
However, the WTO regime does provide exceptions to national 
treatment and MFN requirements for health-related measures.  GATT
article XX(b) exempts measures “necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health,” and appears to be an exception to both national
treatment and MFN requirements.196  This exception is subject to a broad 
requirement of legitimacy or good faith set out in the chapeau to GATT 
article XX. Measures restricting trade under articles XX(b) can be adopted 
only when they “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail,” and “are not a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”197 
Although it is impossible to predict how the WTO Appellate Body
would react to a limited regime of delegated regulation, a few initial
observations can be made.  When interpreting the chapeau to article XX,
the Appellate Body has been hostile to “rigid and unbending requirement[s]”
imposed by a country that requires other WTO members to adopt exactly
one particular regulatory approach.198  However, the Appellate Body has
been far more open to decisions by a country to limit market access to
countries where there is a program “comparable in effectiveness” to that 
of the regulating country.199  This suggests that a role for delegated
regulation in an importing country’s regulatory scheme would not be 
categorically barred under WTO rules. 
195. A third-party certification requirement would be conceptualized as a potential 
nontariff barrier under international trade law. 
196. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 185, art. XX(b). 
197. Id. art. XX. 
198. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 177, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
199. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 144, WT/DS58/ 
AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
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VII. CONCLUSION
If there is one criticism that can be applied to almost all leading 
proposals for imported-food safety reform, it is that they try to do too
much—and in the process risk doing too little.  The current focus on 
“farm-to-fork” regulation risks spreading regulatory resources far too 
thin. It is not sufficient to declare that regulatory resources should be 
allocated using risk analysis techniques.200  The global food supply is
tremendously complicated, and levels of risks are heterogeneous across 
product categories, regions, and stages of production.  Rather than 
seeking to improve safety across the entire food supply, it may be more
effective to focus ex ante regulation efforts on discrete, identifiable risks. 
Focusing on these principal-agent problems raises questions about any 
rush to implement a delegated regulation program on a large scale.
Whether it is done through direct extraterritorial regulation or a delegated 
regulation alternative, inspection programs for foreign production face 
either high costs or self-dealing risks that may blunt the effectiveness of
any large-scale regulatory program.  However, this does not mean that it 
would be unproductive for FDA to move forward with a smaller scale 
program targeted toward high-risk product categories.
Should Congress pass a bill granting FDA authority to rely on delegated
regulation, the agency could begin by licensing a small number of 
monopoly regulators in narrowly defined regions and product categories. 
Specific varieties of aquaculture seafood are possible candidates;201 
dairy products, particularly products involving powdered milk, may be 
200. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IMPORT SAFETY, ACTION PLAN FOR
IMPORT SAFETY: A ROADMAP FOR CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT (2007), available at http://www.
importsafety.gov/report/actionplan.pdf; see also  FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP, FOOD 
SAFETY WORKING GROUP: KEY FINDINGS, available at http://www.foodsafetyworking 
group.gov/FSWG_Key_Findings.pdf. 
201. Currently, aquaculture products from numerous countries are subject to detention
without physical examination at the U.S. border.  See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Import Alert #16-131: Detention Without Physical Examination of Aquacultured Catfish,
Basa, Shrimp, Dace, and Eel from China—Presence of New Animal Drugs and/or Unsafe
Food Additives (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ cms_ia/
importalert_33.html; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Import Alert #16-18: Detention Without
Physical Examination of Shrimp (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_35.html (noting that fresh and frozen shrimp may be detained
from Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand). 
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another.202  FDA would then be faced with registering a manageable set 
of initial companies and would have the chance to develop sensible 
procedures and expertise before moving to a larger set of industries or 
regions. This would also incentivize producers in other industries to
institute voluntary safety procedures that might prevent or slow an FDA 
decision to require delegated regulation in their industry.
Overall, the choice between these regulatory strategies implicates
basic questions about the scope of government.  Within an individual 
state, the choice between direct regulation and delegation to a private 
entity—between the size of the SEC and the size of its private sector
counterpart, the Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority—is a question 
about the role of government and the value placed on competing power
structures. In the multinational context, this choice expands to include
the allocation of authority, and regulatory burden, between importing and
exporting countries. 
202. Milk products from China are currently subject to detention without physical 
examination at the U.S. border. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Import Alert # 99-30: 
Detention Without Physical Examination of All Milk Products, Milk Derived Ingredients 
and Finished Food Products Containing Milk from China Due to the Presence of 
Melamine and/or Melamine Analogs (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.access data.
fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_401.html. 
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